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Introduction:
What is required to accurately judge another’s epistemic prowess in relation to one’s
own epistemic position, specifically in cases of disagreement? How do the requirements relate
to the philosophical dialogue on epistemic peer disagreement? These questions stem from a
gap in contemporary literature on epistemic disagreement; scholars have, in their writings on
epistemic peer disagreement, largely overlooked the question of how one is able to accurately
evaluate whether they are engaged in a certain kind of epistemic disagreement (peer or other).
This paper will argue that a proper evaluation of the epistemic status of another person
in relation to oneself presupposes the possession of the relevant subset of intellectual virtues,
referred to as “p-virtues” throughout the rest of the work. A summation of the claim I am making
is as follows: If person S believes the claim P and S believes that another person, S1, believes
the claim not- P, S knows (or has a justified belief about) the evidential value they have to
accord to S1's disagreement "only if" S has p-virtues.
What, then, are these p-virtues? Further why are they essential to one’s ability to know
or be justified in forming a belief about one’s epistemic disagreement with another? Testimonial
justice (to borrow Fricker’s term 1), and intellectual humility will be argued to be among such
virtues. Section one will advance the introduction of intellectual virtues in the debate on the
epistemology of disagreement. Sections two and three will explicate testimonial justice and
humility as intellectual virtues which are also p-virtues. In section four, a common understanding
of these p-virtues will be invoked to shed light on what precisely is occurring when a lack of pvirtues leads one to misevaluate an epistemic situation, and what harm is associated with this
mistake. The concluding section will briefly reflect on the broader significance of the thesis of
this paper.
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I. Peer Disagreement & Epistemic Evaluations:
The field of peer disagreement in epistemology is both fascinating and rapidly
expanding. Before it can be explored, a working definition of epistemic peers is necessary.
Individuals are considered epistemic peers when neither of them enjoys an advantage nor
suffers from a disadvantage with regards to their knowledge of the evidence and arguments
pertaining to a disagreement, nor stands on unequal footing with regards to cognitive ability or
virtues/vices. If cognitive/evidential advantages, inequalities, or other relevant differences are
present, then the parties involved are divided as epistemic inferiors and superiors.
The question at the heart of this field is this: what is the rational response to
disagreement with an epistemic peer? This question looms over and, to a large degree, shapes
the writing on peer disagreement. There are numerous other queries and directions, which have
been or are being explored due to their relation to the primary question. There is, however, a
distinct but related question: what qualities or characteristics allow one to accurately judge
another as an epistemic inferior, peer, or superior? This question is of great import; since to
reach a stage where the primary question becomes epistemically relevant to one’s
disagreement, one must first be able to establish if any particular disagreement is a case of
disagreement with an epistemic inferior, peer, or superior.
This final question, which I will refer to as ‘p-question,’ is what sparked the thesis of this
work: that there are certain virtues, p-virtues, that must be possessed in order to accurately
assess any given disagreement and assign it to one of the three categories. The p-question
seems to have been largely overlooked by the literature on peer disagreement, and the
explanatory gap must be filled in order for the answers to broader questions to become useful. If
one cannot reliably establish who is an epistemic inferior, peer, or superior, then one greatly
reduces the probability that they will respond rationally to a disagreement, even if they
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possesses the correct answer to the primary question. I will continue on now to establish two
examples of p-virtues.

II. Testimonial Justice:
Testimonial justice will be defined as the negation of testimonial injustice, so it is with the
latter concept that I will begin. First, the context of this particular kind of epistemic injustice
(testimonial injustice is here thought to be a subset of epistemic injustice) is that there is a
situation where a speaker and would be knower attempts to tell a hearer something, and thus
transmit knowledge. “. . .the central case of testimonial injustice is identity-prejudicial credibility
deficit” 2.The two primary components of this definition of testimonial injustice are that it stems
from one’s prejudices against certain perceived identities, and that this prejudice is used by the
hearer to justify giving the speaker lessened credibility as a knower. The hearer’s reliance on
identity prejudices which result in affording the speaker a lowered credibility is an example of
identity power. Using the example of race as a social identity, one can identify testimonial
injustice occurring against (in one of many possible examples) certain racial minorities who are
stereotyped as being poorly raised, less naturally intelligent, and therefore less credible as
knowers 3. This kind of persistent testimonial injustice degrades its subject due to the warped
perspective of the hearer.
The result of testimonial injustice is that the would be knower suffers what Fricker calls a
primary harm: a harm which damages “. . . a capacity essential to human value”. 4 Fricker claims
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that being a knower and capable of freely putting forth ideas into social discourse is a
fundamental aspect of being a human, and I concur. Being harmed as a knower damages this
essentially human aspect of a person. Framing the harm this way allows one to see testimonial
injustice as not just an epistemic detriment, but a powerful tool of oppression which silences
voices of those who are already forced into characteristically inaccurate and unfair social
identities. As Fricker states, the primary harm of this injustice is to undermine the very humanity
of the speaker by restricting a basic human freedom and treating them as less than.
Testimonial justice as a virtue is thought in this work to be the negation of testimonial
injustice; it is the virtue of neutralizing the epistemically harmful prejudices and resulting
credibility deficit that accompany testimonial injustice. The intellectual virtue of testimonial
justice comes first from a habitual and conscientious recognition of the existence of negative
and systematic prejudices, and then proceeding to counter the credibility deficits that stem from
this epistemic injustice by giving additional weight and regard to a speaker whose perceived
identity normally results in their being shackled with a credibility deficit. Possessing this virtue is
crucial to accurately assessing one’s epistemic position to another in the case of a
disagreement, as without it (or if one possesses the vice of testimonial injustice) one will likely
handout credibility deficits that are not related to the speaker’s epistemic competence. The
implications of testimonial justice with regards to disagreement will be further fleshed out in the
section IV of this work. For now, an account of intellectual humility needs to be given.

III. Intellectual Humility:
The definition of the virtue of intellectual humility is contested by scholars, so it will serve
this work to briefly outline a few competing views in order to reveal the relevant implications of
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each. Robert and Wood, in their work Intellectual Virtues 5, extract an idea of intellectual humility
as it relates to corresponding vices like vanity and arrogance. Julia Driver 6 gives an account of
modesty, which is taken to be correlative to humility, in which one must purposely
underestimate and undervalue their own worth. Contrastingly, Garcia 7 offers a definition which
concentrates on the moral as opposed to intellectual virtue of humility, so it must be translated
into one which is intellectual for the purpose of this work. Finally, I will divide up these theories
into two broad categories in order to distinguish how they relate to and support the thesis on the
p-virtues needed by a person to properly assess disagreements.
When illuminated by the vice of intellectual vanity, Roberts and Wood take humility to be
a virtue exhibited when a person is generally unconcerned or inattentive to their intellectual
value or status. Crucially, this does not entail an ignorance or mistaken perception of the
person’s worth; they are not deluded about their worth, they are apathetic to it. The intellectually
vain person would be overly concerned with how they appeared to others, and how their status
and worth is perceived by others.
The vice of intellectual arrogance is said by Roberts and Wood to lay in a person’s
disposition to feel entitled to make extravagant intellectual claims due to the person’s inflated
view of themselves. An intellectually arrogant person sees themselves as superior or more
excellent in terms of their thinking, and uses this self-perception as justification to overstep the
proper intellectual bounds that are set by an accurate view of their intellectual prowess. Using
arrogance as the background for a definition of the virtue of humility, Roberts and Wood say that
the virtue is “. . .a disposition not to make unwarranted intellectual entitlement claims on the
basis of one’s (supposed) superiority or excellence. . .” 8. Repeating the process of drawing
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humility’s definition from a possible opposing vice, intellectual humility here concerns itself not
with how others perceive the person in question, but with the self-perception of the individual.
Further, it is this accurate self-perception and then making of appropriate intellectual claims that
characterize humility when opposed to arrogance.
Roberts and Wood pull together their various accounts of intellectual humility to offer the
following definition: “. . . it is an unusually low dispositional concern for the kind of selfimportance that accrues to persons who are viewed by their intellectual communities as
talented, accomplished, and skilled. . .” 9. Intellectual humility is the habit of a person who has an
accurate evaluation of their own intellectual skills and virtues to pay little attention or mind to
their talents and the like, and not to overestimate the bounds or reach they are entitled to make
in terms of intellectual claims upon the consideration of an accurate self-assessment.
Epistemic modesty, not intellectual humility, is the subject of Driver’s writing. However
this paper will use her account and discuss it as if it is interchangeable with one of intellectual
humility, and examine it as such. The primary features of her definition of modesty are a kind of
limited ignorance and an inaccurate view of oneself. Self-deception and controlled ignorance
are valued by her as tools that lead one to have the intellectual virtue of modesty; she calls this
theory an underestimation account. She discusses several versions of the above view, and
settles on the following as being the most defensible and accurate: “Combination modesty (CM)
is when an agent is modest if he is disposed to underestimate self-worth to some limited extent,
even in spite of the available evidence” 10. Emphasis on the “limited” and “controlled” degree of
ignorance being purported by Driver shows her recognition of the oddity of supporting an
account that involves not only self-deception, but the valuing of ignorance. She examines
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several counter arguments and finds reason to maintain the view above; I will not delve into
these here, but instead continue on to the final account of humility.
The title of Garcia’s writing, Being Unimpressed With Ourselves: Reconceiving
Humility 11, offers a highly condensed view of her theory of humility as a moral virtue. It most
significantly involves, in an abbreviated sense, being duly unimpressed with oneself. Details
arise as she goes on to prescribe a kind of humility where, “The humble are those who are
unimpressed with their own admired or envied features (or admirable or enviable ones), those
who assign little prominence to their possession of characteristics in which they instead might
well take pride” 12. According to Garcia, one relevant distinction between her theory and others is
the inward focus it contains; it is a view in which what is important is self-perception, selfevaluation, and one’s reactions to these. This is said by her to oppose outwardly directed
theories of humility that center on one’s interactions and reactions to others’ perceptions or
assessments. She classifies Roberts and Wood’s brand of humility as belonging to the latter
category, and critiques their view as exhibiting possible but not necessary conditions for
humility. It seems that if we amend her definition to focus on only characteristics which are
strongly connected to garnering epistemic goods or traditional intellectual virtues or skills, then
we can see her theory as one of intellectual instead of purely moral humility.
A useful division of the three theories of humility (or modesty) discussed is to label them
as either promoting an accurate view or belief about one’s epistemic capacity or an inaccurate
one. Driver’s underestimation account advocates for one to have inaccurate beliefs about
themselves, where Garcia’s and Roberts and Wood’s promote accurate self-assessment.
Categorizing these theories as such allows for clarification of humility’s role as a p-virtue.
Inaccurate theories of humility leave room for error in one’s assessment of others in the context
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of disagreement. If one has inaccurate beliefs about their own intellectual worth or value, they
will be more likely to misconstrue their epistemic position in contrast to the person they are
disagreeing with. One may falsely take an epistemic inferior to be a peer, or a peer to be a
superior; either way this misconstruing of the other because of inaccurate beliefs will impact
one’s reaction to the disagreement and cause them to engage improperly with the other.
Theories of humility in which one does have accurate beliefs will negate these possible
mistakes (or at least greatly decrease the chance of them being made), and so allow one to
take the proper action in response to disagreement (whether it be an epistemic inferior, peer, or
superior). Thus, accurate beliefs of oneself are essential to forming accurate beliefs about the
nature of the disagreement and so facilitate an appropriate reaction to the disagreement.

V. Epistemic Trustworthiness & Harm:
What exactly is happening when one misjudges another on the basis of some vice or
lack of corresponding virtue? If one misjudges another’s epistemic prowess, they have
essentially assigned a false value to their degree of epistemic trustworthiness. Borrowing from
Fricker, I take this trustworthiness to consist of the dual elements of competence and sincerity 13.
Misjudging as the result of a lack of humility or the presence of testimonial injustice has a
profound impact. A lack of humility, for instance, may allow one to consider themselves superior
to another who is actually their peer; if this is the case, they may refuse to treat the other as a
knower who is capable of transmitting knowledge to themselves or others, and so harm this
fundamentally human aspect of other. This misjudging of the self further blocks one from
reacting properly to the disagreement at hand.
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Misjudgment may also come in the form of misjudging the other by exhibiting the vice of
testimonial injustice. Here one would, using again an example of genuine peer disagreement,
take the other to be inferior but this time because one’s judgement is distorted with regards to
the other’s abilities and epistemic powers. An accessible and socially relevant example of this
would be if one doles out a credibility deficit to the other on the basis of the other’s dark skin
color. Again a misjudgment has occurred, but this time with regards to one’s underestimating
the other. Such a mistake can dramatically impact the other, who may be discouraged or lose
epistemic confidence due to one’s judging them inferior, when in reality the basis for one’s
judgement is a character flaw and not reflective of the other’s epistemic abilities.
In either case, one’s inaccurate assessment of the other’s epistemic trustworthiness
causes one to do them wrong, on both an epistemic and human level. Further, these kinds of
inaccurate judgements may reflect larger social issues and should be pointed out and corrected
whenever possible.

Conclusion:
It can now be seen that possessing the relevant set of intellectual virtues is needed to
combat the various kinds of harms that spring from epistemic miscalculations. The virtue of
testimonial justice is needed to negate the kind of prejudicial credibility deficits that stem from its
paralleling vice, testimonial injustice. Humility is needed to counteract the hubris that leads one
to mistakenly have an inflated view of their own epistemic position.
Moving from epistemic evaluation of another person to the consideration of epistemic
disagreements and the proper reaction of both parties in the face of varying kinds of
disagreement, a fact becomes salient. Without the p-virtues which include humility, testimonial
justice, and possibly others, one cannot know or have a justified belief regarding the evidential
value they should afford another person’s disagreement with them where they hold the belief
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that P, and the other person (S1) holds that not-P is true. This is because the lack of p-virtues
allows for the fact that one’s response to a disagreement may be suffering from an over-rated
self-evaluation or an identity-prejudicial credibility deficit, and one may be reacting
inappropriately. It is only with the possession of p-virtues that one can be said to know what
evidential value to attribute to a disagreement and react accordingly. The lack of p-virtues rules
out one as knowing how to rationally react to disagreement because there is every chance that,
whatever their reaction, they would be reacting to an illusion based on ego, harmful prejudices,
or both.
Where does my thesis reside in the broader context of contemporary epistemology? It
belongs to the burgeoning literature that seeks to establish theoretically illuminating connections
between social epistemology and virtue epistemology. The cross fertilization of these sub-fields
can be seen in other work by Fricker, where she develops arguments on institutional virtues 14.
Writing of this kind, which utilizes the explanatory ability of theories and terms in the discussed
sub-fields, can reveal new ways of understanding relevant social, moral, and epistemic issues.
I do not imagine that humility and testimonial justice encompass all p-virtues, however,
they seem to play a significant role in allowing us to accurately judge ourselves and others
epistemically. One’s ability to recognize how socially constructed and enforced prejudices form
unjust power structures which manifest (at least in one way) as epistemic injustices is vital to
breaking down said power structures. I look forward to further exploration of these p-virtues and
examining other potential factors like intellectual courage and flexibility that shed light on the
questions considered in this work.

14
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